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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-3484 
________________ 
 
 
In re: Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability 
Litigation 
 
     Robert E. Staggs and Joan E. Staggs, Appellants 
 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 2-99-cv-20593, 2-11-md-01203, 2-16-md-01203) 
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 13, 2015 
 
 
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: April 21, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Robert and Joan Staggs appeal the District Court’s order denying their challenge 
to the decision of the AHP Settlement Trust not to compensate Robert Staggs for the 
alleged injury due to his use of the diet drugs Pondimin and Redux.  We affirm.  
I. Background 
Pondimin and Redux caused widespread injuries to tens of thousands of people.  
Their claims are subject to a settlement agreement pursuant to which AHP Settlement 
Trust pays money to those plaintiffs deemed to have suffered compensable injuries. 
Staggs used Pondimin and Redux and submitted to AHP Settlement Trust a claim 
for what are known as “Matrix Benefits” after he was diagnosed with mild aortic 
regurgitation, a heart condition in which blood flows backward through the aorta and into 
the left ventricle rather than out of the left ventricle.  His claim included a diagnosis by 
Dr. Robert Rosenthal based on a reading of Staggs’s echocardiogram (“EKG”).  AHP 
Settlement Trust referred the claim to Dr. Bryan Lucenta, who agreed that there was 
“mild aortic insufficiency.”  J.A. 3338. 
According to the Settlement Agreement, a claimant suffered a compensable injury 
if an EKG demonstrates mild or greater aortic regurgitation.  To measure this, a person 
must view an EKG and record the regurgitant jet height.  If this value is 10% or more of 
the left ventricular outflow tract height, the subject of the EKG has at least mild aortic 
regurgitation.  Crucially here, according to the Settlement Agreement, the person 
examining the EKG must use the “parasternal long-axis view” to measure regurgitant jet 
height unless that view is unavailable or inadequate, in which case one may use the 
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“apical long-axis view.”  Settlement Agreement § I.22.  This is so because the parasternal 
long-axis view is less likely to over-represent regurgitant jet height. 
Following Dr. Lucenta’s review, Staggs’s claim was audited.  The purpose was to 
determine whether Staggs’s claim had a “reasonable medical basis.”  Settlement 
Agreement § VI.E.6.  Dr. Robert Gillespie, the auditing cardiologist, reviewed Staggs’s 
claim and determined that his EKG showed only trace aortic regurgitation.  He further 
concluded that there was no reasonable medical basis for Dr. Rosenthal’s diagnosis.  
AHP Settlement Trust thus denied Staggs’s claim via a “post-audit determination letter.”  
As the Audit Rules allow, Staggs contested the denial and submitted declarations by Dr. 
Leon Franzin and Dr. Gerald Koppes.   
They opined that the parasternal long-axis view was unavailable, and thus they 
relied on the apical long-axis view to determine that Staggs indeed suffered from mild 
aortic regurgitation.  In response, Dr. Gillespie submitted a declaration explaining that the 
parasternal long-axis view was in fact available and that the EKG showed only trace 
aortic regurgitation.  Thus, the Trust issued a final post-audit determination letter again 
denying Staggs’s claim.  Staggs objected, and the claim went through the settlement’s 
“Show Cause” process, pursuant to which the parties could dispute the claim before the 
District Court. 
It referred the Show Cause proceedings to a Special Master, who appointed the 
Technical Advisor, Dr. Sandra Abramson, to review the record of Staggs’s claim, which 
included his EKG and the opinions of Drs. Rosenthal, Lucenta, Gillespie, Franzin and 
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Koppes.  The Technical Advisor agreed with Dr. Gillespie that there was no reasonable 
medical basis for Staggs’s claim and issued a report to that effect. 
Staggs disagreed with the Technical Advisor and submitted a response to her 
report.  He also tried to submit supplemental reports by Drs. Franzin and Koppes.  
However, the Special Master concluded that, pursuant to Audit Rule 34, these “rebuttals” 
could not be considered as part of the Show Cause record.  J.A. 14–15 n.12.  The District 
Court agreed, considered the whole Show Cause record (without the rebuttal reports of 
Drs. Franzin and Koppes), and ultimately concluded that the Technical Advisor and Dr. 
Gillespie were correct that there was no reasonable medical basis for Staggs’s claim. 
II. Discussion 
Staggs raises three issues on appeal.  He contends that the District Court (1) 
wrongly applied the “reasonable medical basis” standard by failing to defer to his 
physician’s diagnosis; (2) erred in deciding that there was no reasonable medical basis for 
his claim; and (3) violated the Audit Rules and deprived him of due process of law by 
excluding the rebuttal reports of Drs. Franzin and Koppes. 
 A. Reasonable Medical Basis  
Staggs argues that the auditing cardiologist’s review of whether a diagnosis has a 
“reasonable medical basis” must defer to the claimant’s attesting physician.  From this 
premise, he concludes that the attesting physician’s conclusion must be accepted if it is 
“not absurd, not ridiculous, not extreme, and not excessive.”  Appellant Br. at 23.   
It is true that reasonable medical basis review commands a degree of deference: if 
an attesting physician declares a claimant qualifies for matrix benefits and an auditing 
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cardiologist or the District Court disagrees but nonetheless perceives a reasonable 
medical basis for the claim, the claim must be approved.  But, even though those 
reviewing the diagnosis may only examine whether it has a reasonable medical basis and 
not impose their independent judgment of a claimant’s medical condition without regard 
to the attesting physician’s decision, it does not follow that the review is so deferential as 
to require approval of any claim unless it is patently absurd. 
Rather than the standard Staggs urges, we adhere to the definition in our precedent 
and the Audit Training Module: a “reasonable medical basis” is a foundation for a 
diagnosis by an unbiased physician using “normal clinical judgment and accepted 
medical standards.”  J.A. 1489–90.  A reasonable medical basis also exists when a 
diagnosis results from faithful application of the District Court’s orders on “the 
requirements for reading an echocardiogram, see PTO 2640” and “the Auditing 
Cardiologist Training Course, see PTO 2825.”  In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/ 
Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 543 F.3d 179, 189 n.16 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
 B. There Was No Reasonable Medical Basis 
As stated above, Dr. Rosenthal attested that Staggs suffered from mild aortic 
regurgitation; Dr. Gillespie disagreed.  This is a purely factual dispute, and we review the 
District Court’s findings for clear error.  The Court referred the parties’ disagreement to a 
Special Master, who in turn appointed a Technical Advisor “to educate [the Special 
Master] in the jargon and theory disclosed by the [evidence] and to think through the 
critical technical problems.”  Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1988).   
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The core of the parties’ dispute is whether the parasternal long-axis view of 
Staggs’s echocardiogram was available and adequate to evaluate his aortic regurgitation.  
The Technical Advisor, the Special Master, and the District Court all agreed with Dr. 
Gillespie that this preferred view was available and that it showed no reasonable medical 
basis for Staggs’s diagnosis.  For his part, Staggs does not contend that the parasternal 
long-axis view suggests he suffers from aortic regurgitation; rather, he argues this view is 
unavailable and that the experts should have relied on the apical long-axis view, which, 
according to his experts, shows mild aortic regurgitation. 
The Technical Advisor, duly assisting the Court in sorting out “the critical 
technical problems,” id., in this case—(1) whether the parasternal long-axis view was 
available and (2) whether it revealed aortic regurgitation—reviewed the EKG and 
concluded that the preferred view was available.  J.A. 13.  She also persuasively 
explained why the apical view in this case was likely to overstate aortic regurgitation.  Id.  
She further concluded, based on both views, not only that Staggs did not suffer from 
aortic regurgitation but also that there was no reasonable medical basis for his claim.  The 
Advisor’s report explained that the parasternal long-axis view disclosed no regurgitation, 
and the apical long-axis view revealed exaggerated regurgitation. 
Staggs gives us no reason to find clearly erroneous the District Court’s factual 
finding that the parasternal long-axis view was available and adequate to determine 
whether he had aortic regurgitation.  Instead, he reiterates his expert’s opinion to the 
contrary.  Staggs does not contest that the parasternal long-axis view is less likely to 
overestimate aortic regurgitation than the apical long-axis view, and he does not contest 
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that his experts used the latter, disfavored methodology for examining his EKG.  At best, 
Staggs offers an alternative plausible way of reading the evidence, but “[w]here there are 
two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be 
clearly erroneous.”  Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).  In the 
absence of convincing argument to support Staggs’s position, we would “overstep[] the 
bounds of [our] duty” if we second-guessed the District Court’s careful factual finding 
here.  Id. 
C. The District Court’s Procedures Comport with the Audit Rules and 
Due Process 
 
After the Technical Advisor issued her report, Staggs attempted to rebut it by 
submitting two contradictory expert reports that were not a part of the Show Cause 
record.  While parties who disagree with the Technical Advisor are permitted to respond 
to the Advisor’s reports, and while they may consult with experts in drafting their 
responses, the Audit Rules forbid them from submitting additional evidence to 
supplement the Show Cause record.  Audit Rule 34, J.A. 1469. 
Staggs also argues that the limitation on additional evidence violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  “The fundamental requirement of due process is 
the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 
545, 552 (1965)).  Staggs had this opportunity in spades.  He submitted a claim for 
benefits to AHP Settlement Trust; he contested the auditing cardiologist’s finding that his 
claim lacked a reasonable medical basis; he challenged the final post-audit determination 
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letter before the Special Master; he disputed the Technical Advisor’s report; and he 
appealed the Special Master’s decision to the District Court.  At every stage of the 
process, he was represented by counsel.  He had ample opportunity to submit evidence 
and argument to decisionmakers, and he took advantage of the thorough process available 
to him.   
As Staggs “had many opportunities to respond” to the post-audit determination 
letter, he “did not suffer a denial of [his] due process rights.”  Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 
F.3d 47, 60 (3d Cir. 1996).  The District Court needed to close the evidentiary record at 
some point; otherwise the endless submissions of and responses to expert reports would 
“grind judicial . . . gears to a screeching halt.”  Id.  Because the District Court afforded 
Staggs the opportunity to submit expert diagnoses before the Technical Advisor’s report 
and as he had the opportunity to respond to the Technical Advisor’s report in consultation 
with an expert, the District Court’s decision, announced in the Audit Rules, to limit the 
evidentiary record to those documents produced before the Technical Advisor examined 
them comported with due process. 
* * * * * 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 
 
